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10th United States National Security Advisor
In office
January 20, 1977 – January 20, 1981
PresidentJimmy Carter
DeputyDavid Aaron
Preceded byBrent Scowcroft
Succeeded byRichard Allen
Personal details
Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński

March 28, 1928
Warsaw, Poland
DiedMay 26, 2017 (aged 89)
Falls Church, Virginia, U.S.
Political partyDemocratic
ParentsTadeusz Brzeziński
Leonia Roman Brzezińska
RelativesMatthew Brzezinski (nephew)
EducationMcGill University (BA, MA)
Harvard University (PhD)

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski (/ˈzbɪɡnjɛfbrəˈzɪnski/ZBIG-nyef brə-ZIN-skee,[1]Polish: [ˈzbiɡɲɛf kaˈʑimjɛʐ bʐɛˈʑij̃skʲi](listen);[a] March 28, 1928 – May 26, 2017) was a Polish-Americandiplomat and political scientist. He served as a counselor to President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1966 to 1968 and was President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981. Brzezinski belonged to the realist school of international relations, standing in the geopolitical tradition of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman.[2][3] Brzezinski was the primary organizer of The Trilateral Commission.[4]

—ALSO BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. Out of Control The Grand Failure In Quest of National Security Game Plan Power and Principle Between Two Ages. —ALSO BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. Out of Control The Grand Failure In Quest of National Security Game Plan Power and Principle Between Two Ages. Brzezinski Out Of Control Pdf Size Compressor. New York Times the 1. Peterson brothers on Lake Lawn Farm in southwest Wisconsin exhibited several strange and freakish.

Major foreign policy events during his time in office included the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (and the severing of ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan); the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II); the brokering of the Camp David Accords; the transition of Iran from an important U.S. ally to an anti-WesternIslamic Republic led by Khomeini; the United States' encouragement of dissidents in Eastern Europe and championing of human rights in order to undermine the influence of the Soviet Union;[5] the arming of the mujahideen in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the signing of the Torrijos–Carter Treaties relinquishing U.S. control of the Panama Canal after 1999.

Brzezinski served as the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a member of various boards and councils. He appeared frequently as an expert on the PBS program The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, ABC News' This Week with Christiane Amanpour, and on MSNBC's Morning Joe, where his daughter, Mika Brzezinski, is co-anchor. He was a supporter of the Prague Process.[6] His eldest son, Ian, is a foreign policy expert, and his youngest son, Mark, was the United States Ambassador to Sweden from 2011 to 2015.

  • 1Biography
  • 2National Security Advisor
    • 2.1Major policies
  • 9Honours
  • 13Bibliography


Early years[edit]

For historical background on these periods of history, see:
  • History of Poland (1918–39), and
  • Second Polish Republic;
  • Weimar Republic, and
  • Nazi Germany;
  • History of the Soviet Union (1927–53), and
  • Great Purge.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was born in Warsaw, Poland, on March 28, 1928.[7] His family came from Brzeżany in Galicia in the Tarnopol Voivodeship (administrative region) of then eastern Poland (now in Ukraine). The town of Brzeżany is thought to be the source of the family name. Brzezinski's parents were Leonia (née Roman) Brzezińska and Tadeusz Brzeziński, a Polish diplomat who was posted to Germany from 1931 to 1935; Zbigniew Brzezinski thus spent some of his earliest years witnessing the rise of the Nazis.[8] From 1936 to 1938, Tadeusz Brzeziński was posted to the Soviet Union during Joseph Stalin's Great Purge,[9] and was later praised by Israel for his work helping Jews escape from the Nazis.[10]

In 1938, Tadeusz Brzeziński was posted to Montreal as a consul general.[10] In 1939, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was agreed to by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union; subsequently the two powers invaded Poland. The 1945 Yalta Conference among the Allies allotted Poland to the Soviet sphere of influence. The Second World War had a profound effect on Brzezinski, who stated in an interview: 'The extraordinary violence that was perpetrated against Poland did affect my perception of the world, and made me much more sensitive to the fact that a great deal of world politics is a fundamental struggle.'[11]


After attending Loyola High School in Montreal,[12] Brzezinski entered McGill University in 1945 to obtain both his Bachelor and Master of Arts degrees (received in 1949 and 1950 respectively). His Master's thesis focused on the various nationalities within the Soviet Union.[13][14] Brzezinski's plan for pursuing further studies in the United Kingdom in preparation for a diplomatic career in Canada fell through, principally because he was ruled ineligible for a scholarship he had won that was open to British subjects. Brzezinski then attended Harvard University to work on a doctorate with Merle Fainsod, focusing on the Soviet Union and the relationship between the October Revolution, Vladimir Lenin's state, and the actions of Joseph Stalin. He received his Ph.D. in 1953; the same year, he traveled to Munich and met Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, head of the Polish desk of Radio Free Europe. He later collaborated with Carl J. Friedrich to develop the concept of totalitarianism as a way to more accurately and powerfully characterize and criticize the Soviets in 1956.[15]

For historical background on major events during this period, see:

  • History of Poland: Gomułka's road to socialism (1956–70), and
  • 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

As a Harvard professor, he argued against Dwight Eisenhower's and John Foster Dulles's policy of rollback, saying that antagonism would push Eastern Europe further toward the Soviets.[16] The Polish protests followed by the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 lent some support to Brzezinski's idea that the Eastern Europeans could gradually counter Soviet domination. In 1957, he visited Poland for the first time since he left as a child, and his visit reaffirmed his judgement that splits within the Eastern bloc were profound. He developed his ideas he called 'peaceful engagement.'[16] Brzezinski became a naturalized American citizen in 1958.[17]

In 1959, Harvard awarded an associate professorship to Henry Kissinger instead of Brzezinski.[7] He then moved to New York City to teach at Columbia University.[15] Here he wrote Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, which focused on Eastern Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. He also taught future Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who, like Brzezinski's widow Emily, is of Czech descent, and who he also mentored during her early years in Washington.[18] He also became a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and joined the Bilderberg Group.[19]

During the 1960 U.S. presidential elections, Brzezinski was an advisor to the John F. Kennedy campaign, urging a non-antagonistic policy toward Eastern European governments. Seeing the Soviet Union as having entered a period of stagnation, both economic and political, Brzezinski predicted a future breakup of the Soviet Union along lines of nationality (expanding on his master's thesis).[13]

Brzezinski continued to argue for and support détente for the next few years, publishing 'Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe' in Foreign Affairs,[20] and he continued to support non-antagonistic policies after the Cuban Missile Crisis on the grounds that such policies might disabuse Eastern European nations of their fear of an aggressive Germany, and pacify Western Europeans fearful of a superpower compromise along the lines of the Yalta Conference. In a 1962 book Brzezinski argued against the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split, saying their alignment was 'not splitting and is not likely to split.'[7]

The conference venue at the Hotel Regina during the second Wehrkunde-Begegnung in 1964. Pictured are, among others, Zbigniew Brzezinski (far left) as well as Ewald von Kleist and Franz-Josef Strauss (center).

In 1964, Brzezinski supported Lyndon Johnson's presidential campaign and the Great Society and civil rights policies, while on the other hand he saw Soviet leadership as having been purged of any creativity following the ousting of Khrushchev. Through Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, Brzezinski met with Adam Michnik, future Polish Solidarity activist.[citation needed]

Brzezinski continued to support engagement with Eastern European governments, while warning against De Gaulle's vision of a 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.' He also supported the Vietnam War. In 1966, Brzezinski was appointed to the Policy Planning Council of the U.S. Department of State (President Johnson's October 7, 1966, 'Bridge Building' speech was a product of Brzezinski's influence). In 1968, Brzezinski resigned from the council in protest of President Johnson's expansion of the war.[7] Next, he became a foreign policy advisor to Vice President Hubert Humphrey.[7]

For historical background on events during this period, see:

  • Six-Day War;
  • Prague Spring, and
  • Socialism with a human face;
  • Tet offensive.

Events in Czechoslovakia further reinforced Brzezinski's criticisms of the right's aggressive stance toward Eastern European governments. His service to the Johnson administration, and his fact-finding trip to Vietnam, made him an enemy of the New Left.

For the 1968 U.S. presidential campaign, Brzezinski was chairman of the Humphrey's Foreign Policy Task Force.

Brzezinski called for a pan-European conference, an idea that would eventually find fruition in 1973 as the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe.[21] Meanwhile, he became a leading critic of both the Nixon-Kissinger détente condominium, as well as George McGovern's pacifism.[22]

The Trilateral Commission[edit]

In his 1970 piece Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era, Brzezinski argued that a coordinated policy among developed nations was necessary in order to counter global instability erupting from increasing economic inequality. Out of this thesis, Brzezinski co-founded the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller, serving as director from 1973 to 1976.[4] The Trilateral Commission is a group of prominent political and business leaders and academics primarily from the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Its purpose was to strengthen relations among the three most industrially advanced regions of the capitalist world. In 1974, Brzezinski selected Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter as a member.[7][4]


Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Council Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977)

Jimmy Carter announced his candidacy for the 1976 presidential campaign to a skeptical media and proclaimed himself an 'eager student' of Brzezinski.[23] Brzezinski became Carter's principal foreign policy advisor by late 1975. He became an outspoken critic of the Nixon-Kissinger over-reliance on détente, a situation preferred by the Soviet Union, favoring the Helsinki process instead, which focused on human rights, international law and peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe. Brzezinski was considered to be the Democrats' response to RepublicanHenry Kissinger.[24] Carter engaged his incumbent opponent for the presidency, Gerald Ford, in foreign policy debates by contrasting the Trilateral vision with Ford's détente.[25]

After his victory in 1976, Carter made Brzezinski National Security Advisor. Earlier that year, major labor riots broke out in Poland, laying the foundations for Solidarity. Brzezinski began by emphasizing the 'Basket III' human rights in the Helsinki Final Act, which inspired Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia shortly thereafter.[26]/vampire-savior-2-the-lord-of-vampire-download/.

Brzezinski assisted with writing parts of Carter's inaugural address, and this served his purpose of sending a positive message to Soviet dissidents.[27] The Soviet Union and Western European leaders both complained that this kind of rhetoric ran against the 'code of détente' that Nixon and Kissinger had established.[28][29] Brzezinski ran up against members of his own Democratic Party who disagreed with this interpretation of détente, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Vance argued for less emphasis on human rights in order to gain Soviet agreement to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), whereas Brzezinski favored doing both at the same time. Brzezinski then ordered Radio Free Europe transmitters to increase the power and area of their broadcasts, a provocative reversal of Nixon-Kissinger policies.[30] West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt objected to Brzezinski's agenda, even calling for the removal of Radio Free Europe from German soil.[31]

The State Department was alarmed by Brzezinski's support for dissidents in East Germany and objected to his suggestion that Carter's first overseas visit be to Poland. He visited Warsaw and met with CardinalStefan Wyszynski (against the objection of the U.S. Ambassador to Poland), recognizing the Roman Catholic Church as the legitimate opposition to communist rule in Poland.[32]

By 1978, Brzezinski and Vance were more and more at odds over the direction of Carter's foreign policy. Vance sought to continue the style of détente engineered by Nixon-Kissinger, with a focus on arms control. Brzezinski believed that détente emboldened the Soviets in Angola and the Middle East, and so he argued for increased military strength and an emphasis on human rights. Vance, the State Department, and the media criticized Brzezinski publicly as seeking to revive the Cold War.[citation needed]

Brzezinski advised Carter in 1978 to engage the People's Republic of China and traveled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for the normalization of relations between the two countries. This also resulted in the severing of ties with the United States' longtime anti-Communist ally the Republic of China (Taiwan).[citation needed]

For historical background on this period of history, see:
  • Iranian Revolution;
  • Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and
  • Solidarity.

1979 saw two major strategically important events: the overthrow of U.S. ally the Shah of Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution precipitated the Iran hostage crisis, which would last for the rest of Carter's presidency. Brzezinski anticipated the Soviet invasion, and, with the support of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China, he created a strategy to undermine the Soviet presence. Using this atmosphere of insecurity, Brzezinski led the United States toward a new arms buildup and the development of the Rapid Deployment Forces—policies that are both more generally associated with Reagan's presidency now.[citation needed]

On November 9, 1979, Brzezinski was woken at 3 am by a phone call with a startling message: The Soviets had just launched 250 nuclear weapons at the United States. Minutes later, Brzezinski received another call: The early-warning system actually showed 2,000 missiles heading toward the United States.[33] As Brzezinski prepared to phone President Jimmy Carter to plan a full-scale response, he received a third call: It was a false alarm. An early warning training tape generating indications of a large-scale Soviet nuclear attack had somehow transferred to the actual early warning network, which triggered an all-too-real scramble.[33]

Brzezinski, acting under a lame duck Carter presidency—but encouraged that Solidarity in Poland had vindicated his style of engagement with Eastern Europe—took a hard-line stance against what seemed like an imminent Soviet invasion of Poland. He even made a midnight phone call to Pope John Paul II (whose visit to Poland in 1979 had foreshadowed the emergence of Solidarity) warning him in advance. The U.S. stance was a significant change from previous reactions to Soviet repression in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.[citation needed]

Brzezinski developed the Carter Doctrine, which committed the U.S. to use military force in defense of the Persian Gulf.[10] In 1981 President Carter presented Brzezinski with the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

After power[edit]

Brzezinski left office concerned about the internal division within the Democratic party, arguing that the dovish McGovernite wing would send the Democrats into permanent minority. Ronald Reagan invited him to stay on as his National Security Adviser, but Brzezinski declined, feeling that the new president needed a fresh perspective on which to build his foreign policy.[34] He had mixed relations with the Reagan administration. On the one hand, he supported it as an alternative to the Democrats' pacifism. On the other hand, he also criticized it as seeing foreign policy in overly black-and-white terms.[citation needed]

He remained involved in Polish affairs, critical of the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, and more so of the Western European acquiescence to its imposition in the name of stability. Brzezinski briefed U.S. vice-president George H. W. Bush before his 1987 trip to Poland that aided in the revival of the Solidarity movement.[citation needed]

In 1985, under the Reagan administration, Brzezinski served as a member of the President's Chemical Warfare Commission. From 1987 to 1988, he worked on the U.S. National Security Council–Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. From 1987 to 1989 he also served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.[citation needed]

In 1988, Brzezinski was co-chairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, endorsing Bush for president, and breaking with the Democratic party. Brzezinski published The Grand Failure the same year, predicting the failure of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in a few more decades. He said there were five possibilities for the Soviet Union: successful pluralization, protracted crisis, renewed stagnation, coup (by the KGB or Soviet military), or the explicit collapse of the Communist regime. He called collapse 'at this stage a much more remote possibility' than protracted crisis. He also predicted that the chance of some form of communism existing in the Soviet Union in 2017 was a little more than 50% and that when the end did come it would be 'most likely turbulent'. In the event, the Soviet system collapsed totally in 1991 following Moscow's crackdown on Lithuania's attempt to declare independence, the Nagorno-Karabakh War of the late 1980s, and scattered bloodshed in other republics. This was a less violent outcome than Brzezinski and other observers anticipated.[citation needed]

In 1989, the Communists failed to mobilize support in Poland, and Solidarity swept the general elections. Later the same year, Brzezinski toured Russia and visited a memorial to the Katyn Massacre. This served as an opportunity for him to ask the Soviet government to acknowledge the truth about the event, for which he received a standing ovation in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Ten days later, the Berlin Wall fell, and Soviet-supported governments in Eastern Europe began to totter. Strobe Talbott, one of Brzezinski's long-time critics, conducted an interview with him for TIME magazine entitled Vindication of a Hardliner.[citation needed]

In 1990, Brzezinski warned against post–Cold War euphoria. He publicly opposed the Gulf War,[citation needed] arguing that the United States would squander the international goodwill it had accumulated by defeating the Soviet Union, and that it could trigger wide resentment throughout the Arab world. He expanded upon these views in his 1992 work Out of Control.[citation needed]

Brzezinski was prominently critical of the Clinton administration's hesitation to intervene against the Serb forces in the Bosnian war.[35] He also began to speak out against Russia's First Chechen War, forming the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. Wary of a move toward the reinvigoration of Russian power, Brzezinski negatively viewed the succession of former KGB agent Vladimir Putin after Boris Yeltsin. In this vein, he became one of the foremost advocates of NATO expansion. He wrote in 1998 that 'Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.'[36] He later came out in support of the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo war.[37]

National Security Advisor[edit]

Sleep hygiene pdf spanish dictionary. President Carter chose Brzezinski for the position of National Security Adviser (NSA) because he wanted an assertive intellectual at his side to provide him with day-to-day advice and guidance on foreign policy decisions. Brzezinski would preside over a reorganized National Security Council (NSC) structure, fashioned to ensure that the NSA would be only one of many players in the foreign policy process.[38]

Initially, Carter reduced the NSC staff by one-half, and decreased the number of standing NSC committees from eight to two. All issues referred to the NSC were reviewed by one of the two new committees, either the Policy Review Committee (PRC) or the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC). The PRC focused on specific issues, and its chairmanship rotated. The SCC was always chaired by Brzezinski, a circumstance he had to negotiate with Carter to achieve. Carter believed that by making the NSA chairman of only one of the two committees, he would prevent the NSC from being the overwhelming influence on foreign policy decisions it had been under Kissinger's chairmanship during the Nixon administration. The SCC was charged with considering issues that cut across several departments, including oversight of intelligence activities, arms control evaluation, and crisis management. Much of the SCC's time during the Carter years was spent on SALT issues. The Council held few formal meetings, convening only 10 times, compared with 125 meetings during the 8 years of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Instead, Carter used frequent, informal meetings as a decision-making device—typically his Friday breakfasts—usually attended by the Vice President, the secretaries of State and Defense, Brzezinski, and the chief domestic adviser. No agendas were prepared and no formal records were kept of these meetings, sometimes resulting in differing interpretations of the decisions actually agreed upon. Brzezinski was careful, in managing his own weekly luncheons with secretaries Vance and Brown in preparation for NSC discussions, to maintain a complete set of notes. Brzezinski also sent weekly reports to the President on major foreign policy undertakings and problems, with recommendations for courses of action. President Carter enjoyed these reports and frequently annotated them with his own views. Brzezinski and the NSC used these Presidential notes (159 of them) as the basis for NSC actions.[39]

From the beginning, Brzezinski made sure that the new NSC institutional relationships would assure him a major voice in the shaping of foreign policy. While he knew that Carter would not want him to be another Kissinger, Brzezinski also felt confident that the President did not want Secretary of State Vance to become another Dulles and would want his own input on key foreign policy decisions. Brzezinski's power gradually expanded into the operational area during the Carter Presidency. He increasingly assumed the role of a Presidential emissary. In 1978, for example, Brzezinski traveled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for normalizing U.S.–PRC relations. Like Kissinger before him, Brzezinski maintained his own personal relationship with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin. Brzezinski had NSC staffers monitor State Department cable traffic through the Situation Room and call back to the State Department if the President preferred to revise or take issue with outgoing State Department instructions. He also appointed his own press spokesman, and his frequent press briefings and appearances on television interview shows made him a prominent public figure, although perhaps not nearly as much as Kissinger had been under Nixon.<[40]

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 significantly damaged the already tenuous relationship between Vance and Brzezinski. Vance felt that Brzezinski's linkage of SALT to other Soviet activities and the MX, together with the growing domestic criticisms in the United States of the SALT II Accord, convinced Brezhnev to decide on military intervention in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, however, later recounted that he advanced proposals to maintain Afghanistan's independence but was frustrated by the Department of State's opposition. An NSC working group on Afghanistan wrote several reports on the deteriorating situation in 1979, but Carter ignored them until the Soviet intervention destroyed his illusions. Only then did he decide to abandon SALT II ratification and pursue the anti-Soviet policies that Brzezinski proposed.[41]

The Iranian revolution was the last straw for the disintegrating relationship between Vance and Brzezinski. As the upheaval developed, the two advanced fundamentally different positions. Brzezinski wanted to control the revolution and increasingly suggested military action to prevent Ayatollah Khomeini from coming to power, while Vance wanted to come to terms with the new Islamic Republic of Iran. As a consequence, Carter failed to develop a coherent approach to the Iranian situation. Vance's resignation following the unsuccessful mission to rescue the American hostages in March 1980, undertaken over his objections, was the final result of the deep disagreement between Brzezinski and Vance.[42]

Major policies[edit]

During the 1960s, Brzezinski articulated the strategy of peaceful engagement for undermining the Soviet bloc, and while serving on the State Department Policy Planning Council, persuaded President Lyndon B. Johnson to adopt (in October 1966) peaceful engagement as U.S. strategy, placing détente ahead of German reunification and thus reversing prior U.S. priorities.[citation needed]

During the 1970s and 1980s, at the height of his political involvement, Brzezinski participated in the formation of the Trilateral Commission in order to more closely cement U.S.–Japanese–European relations. As the three most economically advanced sectors of the world, the people of the three regions could be brought together in cooperation that would give them a more cohesive stance against the communist world.[43]

While serving in the White House, Brzezinski emphasized the centrality of human rights as a means of placing the Soviet Union on the ideological defensive. With Jimmy Carter in Camp David, he assisted in the attainment of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty.[44]

He actively supported Polish Solidarity and the Afghan resistance to Soviet invasion, and provided covert support for national independence movements in the Soviet Union.[citation needed] He played a leading role in normalizing U.S.–PRC relations and in the development of joint strategic cooperation, cultivating a relationship with Deng Xiaoping, for which he is thought very highly of in mainland China to this day.[citation needed]

In the 1990s he formulated the strategic case for buttressing the independent statehood of Ukraine, partially as a means to prevent a resurgence of the Russian Empire,[citation needed] and to drive Russia toward integration with the West, promoting instead 'geopolitical pluralism' in the space of the former Soviet Union. He developed 'a plan for Europe' urging the expansion of NATO, making the case for the expansion of NATO to the Baltic states.

He served as Bill Clinton's emissary to Azerbaijan in order to promote the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Subsequently, he became a member of Honorary Council of Advisors of U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce (USACC). Further, he led, together with Lane Kirkland, the effort to increase the endowment for the U.S.-sponsored Polish-American Freedom Foundation from the proposed $112 million to an eventual total of well over $200 million.[citation needed]


Carter, Brzezinski and Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia

Communists under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Tarakiseized power in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978.[45] The new regime—divided between Taraki's extremist Khalq faction and the more moderate Parcham—signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in December of that year.[45][46] Taraki's efforts to improve secular education and redistribute land were accompanied by mass executions (including of many conservative religious leaders) and political oppression unprecedented in Afghan history, igniting a revolt by mujahideen rebels.[45] Following a general uprising in April 1979, Taraki was deposed by Khalq rival Hafizullah Amin in September.[45][46] Amin was considered a 'brutal psychopath' by foreign observers; even the Soviets were alarmed by the brutality of the Afghan communists, and suspected Amin of being an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), although that was not the case.[45][46][47] By December, Amin's government had lost control of much of the country, prompting the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan, execute Amin, and install Parcham leader Babrak Karmal as president.[45][46]

President Carter was surprised by the invasion, as the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community during 1978 and 1979—reiterated as late as September 29, 1979—was that 'Moscow would not intervene in force even if it appeared likely that the Khalq government was about to collapse.' Indeed, Carter's diary entries from November 1979 until the Soviet invasion in late December contain only two short references to Afghanistan, and are instead preoccupied with the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran.[48] In the West, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered a threat to global security and the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf.[46] Moreover, the failure to accurately predict Soviet intentions caused American officials to reappraise the Soviet threat to both Iran and Pakistan, although it is now known that those fears were overblown. For example, U.S. intelligence closely followed Soviet exercises for an invasion of Iran throughout 1980, while an earlier warning from Brzezinski that 'if the Soviets came to dominate Afghanistan, they could promote a separate Baluchistan .. [thus] dismembering Pakistan and Iran' took on new urgency.[47][48] These concerns were a major factor in the unrequited efforts of both the Carter and Reagan administrations to improve relations with Iran, and resulted in massive aid to Pakistan's Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Zia's ties with the U.S. had been strained during Carter's presidency due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1979, but Carter told Brzezinski and Secretary of StateCyrus Vance as early as January 1979 that it was vital to 'repair our relationships with Pakistan' in light of the unrest in Iran.[48] One initiative Carter authorized to achieve this goal was a collaboration between the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); through the ISI, the CIA began providing some $500,000 worth of non-lethal assistance to the mujahideen on July 3, 1979—several months prior to the Soviet invasion. The modest scope of this early collaboration was likely influenced by the understanding, later recounted by CIA official Robert Gates, 'that a substantial U.S. covert aid program' might have 'raise[d] the stakes' thereby causing 'the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended'.[48][49][50] The first shipment of U.S.weapons intended for the mujahideen reached Pakistan on January 10, 1980, shortly following the Soviet invasion.[47]

In the aftermath of the invasion, Carter was determined to respond vigorously to what he considered a dangerous provocation. In a televised speech, he announced sanctions on the Soviet Union, promised renewed aid to Pakistan, and committed the U.S. to the Persian Gulf's defense.[48][49] The thrust of U.S. policy for the duration of the war was determined by Carter in early 1980: Carter initiated a program to arm the mujahideen through Pakistan's ISI and secured a pledge from Saudi Arabia to match U.S. funding for this purpose. U.S. support for the mujahideen accelerated under Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, at a final cost to U.S. taxpayers of some $3 billion. The Soviets were unable to quell the insurgency and withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, precipitating the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.[48] However, the decision to route U.S. aid through Pakistan led to massive fraud, as weapons sent to Karachi were frequently sold on the local market rather than delivered to the Afghan rebels; Karachi soon 'became one of the most violent cities in the world'. Pakistan also controlled which rebels received assistance: Of the seven mujahideen groups supported by Zia's government, four espoused Islamic fundamentalist beliefs—and these fundamentalists received most of the funding.[46] Years later, in a 1997 CNN/National Security Archive interview, Brzezinski detailed the strategy taken by the Carter administration against the Soviets in 1979:

We immediately launched a twofold process when we heard that the Soviets had entered Afghanistan. The first involved direct reactions and sanctions focused on the Soviet Union, and both the State Department and the National Security Council prepared long lists of sanctions to be adopted, of steps to be taken to increase the international costs to the Soviet Union of their actions. And the second course of action led to my going to Pakistan a month or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response, the purpose of which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again—for example, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from the Czechoslovak communist government, since it was obviously susceptible to material incentives; and at some point we started buying arms for the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army in Afghanistan, because that army was increasingly corrupt.[51]

When asked if he regretted supporting Islamist groups in their fight against the Soviet Union, Brzezinski replied, 'What was more important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold war?'[52] Brzezinski argued that U.S. aid was 'quite important in hastening the end of the conflict, not in deciding the conflict,' as 'in my view, the Afghans would have prevailed in the end anyway, 'cause they had access to money, they had access to weapons, and they had the will to fight.' He further noted: 'The Soviet Union at the time was actively engaged in helping international terrorism, including those elements of the PLO that were very active .. So it was a good thing that the Soviets were bogged down in Afghanistan.'[53]


The Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, meeting with Arthur Atherton, William H. Sullivan, Cyrus Vance, President Jimmy Carter, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in 1977

In November 1979, revolutionary students stormed the Embassy of the United States, Tehran and took American diplomats hostage. Brzezinski argued against Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's proposed diplomatic solutions to the Iran hostage crisis, insisting they 'would deliver Iran to the Soviets.'[7] Vance, struggling with gout, went to Florida on Thursday, April 10, 1980, for a long weekend.[54] On Friday, Brzezinski held a newly scheduled meeting of the National Security Council and authorized Operation Eagle Claw, a military expedition into Tehran to rescue the hostages.[54] Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, who attended the meeting in Vance's place, did not inform Vance.[54] Furious, Vance handed in his resignation on principle, calling Brzezinski 'evil'.[54]

President Carter aborted the operation after three of the eight helicopters he had sent into the Dasht-e Kavir desert crashed, and a fourth then collided with a transport plane, causing a fire that killed eight servicemen.[54] The hostages were ultimately released on the day of the first inauguration of Ronald Reagan, after 444 days in captivity.[55]


Brzezinski hosts a dinner for Chinese Communist leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979

Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Carter again reaffirmed the United States' position of upholding the Shanghai Communiqué. In May 1978, Brzezinski overcame concerns from the State Department and traveled to Beijing, where he began talks that seven months later led to full diplomatic relations.[7] The United States and People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978, that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. This required that the United States sever relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Consolidating U.S. gains in befriending Communist China was a major priority stressed by Brzezinski during his time as National Security Advisor. However, Brzezinski 'denied reports that he encouraged China to support the genocidal dictator Pol Pot in Cambodia, because Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge were the enemies of communist Vietnam.'[56]

The most important strategic aspect of the new U.S.–Chinese relationship was in its effect on the Cold War. China was no longer considered part of a larger Sino-Soviet bloc but instead a third pole of power due to the Sino-Soviet Split, helping the United States against the Soviet Union.[citation needed]

In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The United States reiterated the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the PRC position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; Beijing acknowledged that the United States would continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act made the necessary changes in U.S. law to permit unofficial relations with Taiwan to continue.

In addition the severing relations with the Republic of China, the Carter Administration also agreed to unilaterally pull out of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, withdraw U.S. military personnel from Taiwan, and gradually reduce arms sales to the Republic of China. There was widespread opposition in Congress, notably from Republicans, due to the Republic of China's status as an anti-Communist ally in the Cold War. In Goldwater v. Carter, Barry Goldwater made a failed attempt to stop Carter from terminating the mutual defense treaty.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter with Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance at Camp David in 1977
Zbigniew brzezinski out of control

PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington, D.C., initiated a series of high-level exchanges, which continued until the Tiananmen Square massacre, when they were briefly interrupted. This resulted in many bilateral agreements, especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange and trade relations. Since early 1979, the United States and the PRC have initiated hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.[citation needed]

On March 1, 1979, the United States and People's Republic of China formally established embassies in Beijing and Washington. During 1979, outstanding private claims were resolved, and a bilateral trade agreement was concluded. U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's visit with an August 1979 trip to China. This visit led to agreements in September 1980 on maritime affairs, civil aviation links, and textile matters, as well as a bilateral consular convention.[citation needed]

As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in 1980, U.S. dialogue with China broadened to cover a wide range of issues, including global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions—including arms control, UN and other multilateral organization affairs, and international narcotics matters.[citation needed]

Arab-Israeli conflict[edit]

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin engages Brzezinski in a game of chess at Camp David

On October 10, 2007, Brzezinski along with other influential signatories sent a letter to President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice titled 'Failure Risks Devastating Consequences.' The letter was partly an advice and a warning of the failure of an upcoming[57] U.S.-sponsored Middle East conference scheduled for November 2007 between representatives of Israelis and Palestinians. The letter also suggested to engage in 'a genuine dialogue with Hamas' rather than to isolate it further.[58]

Ending détente[edit]

Presidential Directive 18 on U.S. National Security, signed early in Carter's term, signaled a fundamental reassessment of the value of détente, and set the United States on a course to quietly end Kissinger's strategy.[59]

Nuclear strategy[edit]

Presidential Directive 59, 'Nuclear Employment Policy', dramatically changed U.S. targeting of nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union. Implemented with the aid of Defense Secretary Harold Brown, this directive officially set the United States on a countervailing strategy.[clarification needed][60]

Arms control[edit]

President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) treaty, June 18, 1979, in Vienna (Austria). Brzezinski is directly behind President Carter.


Brzezinski was on the faculty of Harvard University from 1953 to 1960, and of Columbia University from 1960 to 1989 where he headed the Institute on Communist Affairs. He was Senior Research Professor of International Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.[61]

As a scholar, he developed his thoughts over the years, fashioning fundamental theories on international relations and geostrategy. During the 1950s he worked on the theory of totalitarianism. His thought in the 1960s focused on wider Western understanding of disunity in the Soviet Bloc, as well as developing the thesis of intensified degeneration of the Soviet Union. During the 1970s he proposed that the Soviet system was incapable of evolving beyond the industrial phase into the 'technetronic' age.

By the 1980s, Brzezinski argued that the general crisis of the Soviet Union foreshadowed communism's end.

Later years[edit]

Former National Security Advisers meet with President Barack Obama in 2010. Seated at the table, from left, are Brent Scowcroft, Bud McFarlane, Colin Powell, Dennis Ross, Sandy Berger, Frank Carlucci, and Brzezinski.

After his role as National Security Adviser came to a close, Brzezinski returned to teaching but remained an influential voice in international relations. Polish politician Radek Sikorski wrote that to Poles, Brzezinski was considered 'our statesman' and his was one of the most revered voices in Poland: 'During the decades when Poland was stuck against her will behind the Iron Curtain, he and the Polish pope were the two most important voices for a free Poland abroad. After liberation, he acted as an adviser and champion of the new democracies on their way to rejoining Western institutions.'[62]

Though he rose to national prominence as a member of the Carter administration, Brzezinski avoided partisan politics and sometimes voted Republican. In 1988, he endorsed Republican George H. W. Bush for president.[63]

Brzezinski argued against the 2003 invasion of Iraq and was outspoken in the then-unpopular opinion that the invasion would be a mistake. As recalled by David Ignatius, 'Brzezinski paid a cost in the insular, self-reinforcing world of Washington foreign policy opinion, until it became clear to nearly everyone that he (joined in this Iraq War opposition by Scowcroft) had been right.'[64] He later called President George W. Bush's foreign policy 'catastrophic.'[7] Brzezinski was a leading critic of the George W. Bush Administration's conduct of the War on Terror. In 2004, Brzezinski wrote The Choice, which expanded upon his earlier work,The Grand Chessboard(1997), and sharply criticized George W. Bush's foreign policy. In 2007, in a column in The Washington Post, Brzezinski excoriated the Bush administration, arguing that their post-9/11 actions had damaged the reputation of the United States 'infinitely greater than any wild dreams entertained by the fanatical perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks' and destroyed any chance of uniting the world to defeat extremism and terrorism.[65] He later stated that he had 'visceral contempt' for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who supported Bush's actions in Iraq.[63]

He defended the book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy by John Mearsheimer.[66]

In August 2007, Brzezinski endorsed Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama. He stated that Obama 'recognizes that the challenge is a new face, a new sense of direction, a new definition of America's role in the world'[67] and that 'What makes Obama attractive to me is that he understands that we live in a very different world where we have to relate to a variety of cultures and people.'[68] In September 2007 during a speech on the Iraq war, Obama introduced Brzezinski as 'one of our most outstanding thinkers,' but some pro-Israel commentators questioned his criticism of the Israel lobby in the United States.[66] In a September 2009 interview with The Daily Beast, Brzezinski replied to a question about how aggressive President Obama should be in insisting Israel not conduct an air strike on Iran, saying: 'We are not exactly impotent little babies. They have to fly over our airspace in Iraq. Are we just going to sit there and watch?'[69] This was interpreted by some supporters of Israel as supporting the downing of Israeli jets by the United States in order to prevent an attack on Iran.[70][71] On October 1, 2009, Brzezinski delivered the Waldo Family Lecture on International Relations at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.[72] In 2011, Brzezinski supported the NATO intervention against the forces of Muammar Gaddafi in the Libyan Civil War, calling non-intervention 'morally dubious' and 'politically questionable'.[73]

In early 2012, Brzezinski expressed disappointment and said he was confused by some of Obama's actions, such as the decision to send 2,500 U.S. troops to Australia, but supported him for re-election.[63]

Brzezinski at the Munich Security Conference, 2014

On March 3, 2014, between the February 22 ousting of Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych and the March 16, Crimean referendum, Brzezinski authored an op-ed piece for The Washington Post entitled 'What is to be done? Putin's aggression in Ukraine needs a response.'[74] He led with a link on Russian aggression; he compared Russian President Vladimir Putin's 'thuggish tactics in seizing Crimea' and 'thinly camouflaged invasion' to Adolf Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938, and characterized Putin as a cartoon Benito Mussolini, but stopped well short of advocating that the U.S. go to war. Rather, he suggested that NATO should be put on high alert and recommended 'to avert miscalculations'. He explicitly stated that reassurances be given to 'Russia that it is not seeking to draw Ukraine into NATO.'[74]

Zbigniew Brzezinski Out Of Control

According to Ignatius and Sikorski, Brzezinski was 'deeply troubled' by the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States and worried over the future. Two days after the election, on November 10, 2016, Brzezinski warned of 'coming turmoil in the nation and the world' in a brief speech after he was awarded the Medal for Distinguished Public Service from the Department of Defense.[64] On May 4, 2017, he sent out his final Tweet, saying, 'Sophisticated US leadership is the sine qua non of a stable world order. However, we lack the former while the latter is getting worse.'[62]

Personal life[edit]

Brzezinski was married to Czech-American sculptor Emilie Benes (grand-niece of the second Czechoslovak president, Edvard Beneš), with whom he had three children. His younger son, Mark Brzezinski (b. 1965), is a lawyer who served on President Clinton's National Security Council as an expert on Russia and Southeastern Europe, and served as the U.S. ambassador to Sweden (2011–2015). His daughter, Mika Brzezinski (b. 1967), is a television news presenter and co-host of MSNBC's weekday morning program, Morning Joe, where she provides regular commentary and reads the news headlines for the program. His elder son, Ian Brzezinski (b. 1963), is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program and is on the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group. Ian also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO (2001–2005) and was a principal at Booz Allen Hamilton.[75]

Public life[edit]

Brzezinski was a past member of the Atlantic Council and the National Endowment for Democracy.[76] At the time of his death, he was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations[77] and the International Honorary Council[78] of the European Academy of Diplomacy.

Film appearances[edit]

Brzezinski appeared as himself in several documentary films and TV series, such as: the 1997 film Eternal Memory: Voices from the Great Terror, directed by David Pultz; Episodes 17 (Good Guys, Bad Guys), 19 (Freeze) and 20 (Soldiers of God) of the 1998 CNN series Cold War produced by Jeremy Isaacs; the 2009 documentary Back Door Channels: The Price of Peace; and the 2014 Polish biopicStrateg (The Strategist) directed by Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska and produced by TVN. The 2014 Polish film Jack Strong features Krzysztof Pieczyński as Brzezinski.


Wikinews has related news: Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski dies aged 89

Brzezinski died at Inova Fairfax Hospital in Falls Church, Virginia, on May 26, 2017 at the age of 89.[79][80] His funeral was held June 9 at the Cathedral of St. Matthew in Washington, D.C.[81] Former President Carter and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were among those who gave eulogies, while attendees included international diplomats and emissaries; journalists Carl Bernstein, Chuck Todd and David Ignatius; 100-year-old Gen. Edward Rowny; former National Security Adviser Susan E. Rice; and former National Security Advisor, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster. 'If I could choose my seatmate, it would be Dr. Brzezinski,' Carter said of his international flights on Air Force One. Former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, aged 94, was unable to attend, but a note he sent was read during a eulogy: 'The world is an emptier place without Zbig pushing the limits of his insights.'[82]


  • Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1981[83]
  • Order of the White Eagle, 1995[84]
  • Honorary citizenship of the City of Gdańsk, 2002

Honorary degrees[edit]

New York1979Fordham UniversityDoctorate[85]
Massachusetts9 June 1986Williams CollegeDoctor of Laws (LL.D)[86][87]
Poland1990John Paul II Catholic University of LublinDoctorate[88]
Lithuania1998Vilnius UniversityDoctorate[89]
Azerbaijan7 November 2003Baku State UniversityDoctorate[88]


  1. ^In isolation, Kazimierz is pronounced [kaˈʑimjɛʂ].


  1. ^'Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski And His Life On The World Stage'. Morning Joe. MSNBC. May 30, 2017. Event occurs at 4:12.
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  3. ^Seiple, Chris (November 27, 2006). 'Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United States–Uzbekistan Relations 1991–2005'(PDF). Archived from the original(PDF) on August 28, 2017. Retrieved August 18, 2014.Cite uses deprecated parameter dead-url= (help)
  4. ^ abcSklar, Holly. “Founding the Trilateral Commission: Chronology 1970-1977”. Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management. Boston: South End Press, 1980. ISBN0-89608-103-6ISBN0-89608-104-4OCLC6958001 604 pages. Excerpts available.
  5. ^Tim Weiner. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.
  6. ^'Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism' (Press release). Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. June 9, 2008. Archived from the original on May 18, 2011. Retrieved May 10, 2011.Cite uses deprecated parameter deadurl= (help)
  7. ^ abcdefghiLewis, Daniel (May 27, 2017). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, Dies at 89'. The New York Times. p. A1. ISSN0362-4331. Retrieved May 27, 2017.
  8. ^'Tadeusz Brzezinski, Former Polish Consul-General, Dies'. Retrieved May 25, 2016.
  9. ^Gati (2013) p. 237
  10. ^ abcHoagland, Jim (May 26, 2017). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski, foreign policy intellectual who served as Carter's national security adviser, dies at 89'. The Washington Post. Retrieved May 27, 2017.
  11. ^Al Jazeera: One on One – Zbigniew Brzezinski on YouTube
  12. ^Gravenor, Kristian (February 13, 2007). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski's Montreal recollections'. Coolopolis. Retrieved August 22, 2008.
  13. ^ abYong, Tang (March 20, 2006). ''Agenda for constructive American-Chinese dialogue huge': Brzezinski'. People's Daily. Retrieved December 30, 2010.
  14. ^Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1950). Russo-Soviet Nationalism (Thesis). McGill University.
  15. ^ abGati (2013) p. 208
  16. ^ abGati (2013) p. xxi
  17. ^'Brzezinski, Zbigniew 1928–'. Social networks and archival context. University of Virginia. Retrieved May 10, 2017.
  18. ^Albright, Madeleine (2003). Madam Secretary. Hyperion. p. 57.
  19. ^Gati (2013) p. 12
  20. ^Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Griffith, William (Spring 1961). 'Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe'. Foreign Affairs. 39 (4): 647. doi:10.2307/20029518.
  21. ^Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Détente in the '70s', The New Republic (January 3, 1970), p. 18.
  22. ^Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Meeting Moscow's Limited Coexistence', The New Leader, 51:24 (December 16, 1968), pp. 11–13.
  23. ^Brauer, Carl (November 1, 1988). 'Lost In Transition'. The Atlantic. Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Media. Retrieved March 27, 2014.
  24. ^John Maclean, 'Advisers Key to Foreign Policy Views', The Boston Evening Globe (October 5, 1976)
  25. ^Vaughan, Patrick G. (2008). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Helsinki Final Act'. In Nuti, Leopoldo (ed.). The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985. Taylor & Francis. pp. 11–25. ISBN0-415-46051-4.
  26. ^Michael Getler, 'Dissidents Challenge Prague – Tension Builds Following Demand for Freedom and Democracy', The Washington Post (January 21, 1977).
  27. ^Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York, 1983), p. 123.
  28. ^Seyom Brown, Faces of Power (New York, 1983), p. 539.
  29. ^'Giscard, Schmidt on Détente', The Washington Post (July 19, 1977).
  30. ^David Binder, 'Carter Requests Funds for Big Increase in Broadcasts to Soviet Bloc', The New York Times (March 23, 1977).
  31. ^Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 293.
  32. ^David A. Andelman, 'Brzezinski and Mrs. Carter Hold Discussion with Polish Cardinal', The New York Times (December 29, 1977).
  33. ^ ab'The 3 A.M. Phone Call'. National Security Archive. George Washington University. March 1, 2012. Retrieved February 11, 2017.
  34. ^''Reagan poprosił Brzezińskiego, by został także jego doradcą''. TVN24.pl. May 29, 2017. Retrieved June 1, 2017.
  35. ^Brzezinski on isolation: former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski warns of the failures of Clinton foreign policy, Insight on the News, August 21, 1995
  36. ^'The New Great Game: Why Ukraine Matters to So Many Other Nations'. Bloomberg. February 27, 2014.
  37. ^A conversation about Kosovo with Zbigniew BrzezinskiArchived October 8, 2012, at the Wayback Machine Charlie Rose, March 25, 1999
  38. ^Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist (2018) ch 6.
  39. ^Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski' (2018) ch 6.
  40. ^Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos (2016). Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy. Springer. pp. 143–44.
  41. ^Brian J. Auten (2008). Carter's Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy. p. 276.
  42. ^Gary Sick, All fall down: America's fateful encounter with Iran (IB Tauris, 1985).
  43. ^http://dinoknudsen.dk/books-pamphlets
  44. ^Brzezinski, Zbigniew (August 31, 1978). 'Strategy for Camp David'(PDF). CIA. Retrieved February 11, 2017.
  45. ^ abcdefKaplan, Robert D. (2008). Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Knopf Doubleday. pp. 115–117. ISBN978-0-307-54698-2.
  46. ^ abcdefKepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. pp. 138–139, 142–144. ISBN978-1-84511-257-8.
  47. ^ abcBlight, James G.; et al. (2012). Becoming Enemies: U.S.–Iran Relations and the Iran–Iraq War, 1979–1988. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 66, 69–70. ISBN978-1-4422-0830-8.
  48. ^ abcdefRiedel, Bruce (2014). What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Brookings Institution Press. pp. ix–xi, 21–22, 93, 98–99, 105. ISBN978-0-8157-2595-4.
  49. ^ abGates, Robert (2007). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. Simon and Schuster. pp. 145–147. ISBN978-1-4165-4336-7. When asked whether he expected that the revelations in his memoir (combined with an apocryphal quote attributed to Brzezinski) would inspire 'a mind-bending number of conspiracy theories which adamantly—and wrongly—accuse the Carter Administration of luring the Soviets into Afghanistan', Gates replied: 'No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily.' See Gates, email communication with John Bernell White, Jr., October 15, 2011, as cited in White, John Bernell (May 2012). 'The Strategic Mind Of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How A Native Pole Used Afghanistan To Protect His Homeland'. pp. 45–46, 82. Retrieved August 23, 2017.
  50. ^Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. pp. 87, 581. ISBN978-1-59420-007-6. Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail. .. Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.
  51. ^'Interview with Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski'. June 13, 1997. Archived from the original on August 29, 2000. Retrieved May 25, 2016.Cite uses deprecated parameter deadurl= (help)
  52. ^'Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Vietnam'. Al Jazeera. April 23, 2003. While it seemed like a good idea at the time to provide the mujahideen with CIA training, funding and equipment, Afghanistan evolved into a breeding ground for Islamist groups which had little love for the US either. The most prominent figure to rise from Afghanistan is Osama bin Laden, leader of the al-Qaeda group ..
  53. ^'The Afghan war and the 'Grand Chessboard' Pt2'. The Real News. January 15, 2010. Retrieved May 27, 2017.
  54. ^ abcdeDouglas Brinkley (December 29, 2002). 'The Lives They Lived; Out of the Loop'. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  55. ^Marilyn Berger (January 13, 2002). 'Cyrus R. Vance, a Confidant Of Presidents, Is Dead at 84'. The New York Times. p. A1. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  56. ^Hodgson, Godfrey (May 28, 2017). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski obituary'. The Guardian. Retrieved May 28, 2017.
  57. ^Jackson, David (July 17, 2007). 'Bush announces Mideast peace conference'. USA Today.
  58. ^Paul Volcker. ''Failure Risks Devastating Consequences' by Zbigniew Brzezinski'. The New York Review of Books. Retrieved May 25, 2016.
  59. ^'Unclassified Memorandum from National Security Council'(PDF). Jimmycarterlibrary.org. August 27, 1977. Archived from the original(PDF) on July 21, 2011. Retrieved December 31, 2010.Cite uses deprecated parameter dead-url= (help)
  60. ^Nuclear Employment PolicyArchived April 3, 2013, at the Wayback Machine[failed verification]' (PDF)
  61. ^'Zbigniew Brzezinski, PhD'. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Archived from the original on October 25, 2015. Retrieved February 11, 2017.Cite uses deprecated parameter dead-url= (help)
  62. ^ abSikorski, Radek (May 27, 2017). 'For Poles, Zbigniew Brzezinski was our American statesman'. The Washington Post. Retrieved June 1, 2017.
  63. ^ abcLuce, Edward (January 13, 2012). 'Lunch with the FT: Zbigniew Brzezinski'. Financial Times. Retrieved June 1, 2017.
  64. ^ abIgnatius, David (May 29, 2017). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski was an intrepid advocate of the 'liberal international order''. The Washington Post. Retrieved June 1, 2017.
  65. ^Brzezinski, Zbigniew (March 25, 2007). 'Terrorized by 'War on Terror''. The Washington Post. Retrieved June 1, 2017.
  66. ^ abObama advisor raises concerns, Ynet, September 15, 2007.
  67. ^Alec MacGillis, Brzezinski Backs Obama, Washington Post, August 25, 2007.
  68. ^Eric Walberg, The real power behind the throne-to-beArchived September 10, 2009, at the Wayback Machine, Al-Ahram, July 24–30, 2008.
  69. ^Gerald Posner, How Obama Flubbed His Missile Message, The Daily Beast, undated.
  70. ^Brzezinski: U.S. must deny Israel airspaceArchived September 25, 2009, at the Wayback Machine, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 21, 2009.
  71. ^Jake Tapper, Zbig Brzezinski: Obama Administration Should Tell Israel U.S. Will Attack Israeli Jets if They Try to Attack IranArchived October 18, 2009, at the Wayback Machine, ABC News, September 20, 2009.
  72. ^'Thursday, September 24'. Hearsay.org. Retrieved August 14, 2019. first1= missing last1= (help)
  73. ^PBS: Turmoil in Arab World: Deepening Divisions or Turning a New Page?
  74. ^ ab'Zbigniew Brzezinski: After Putin's aggression in Ukraine, the West must be ready to respond'. Washington Post. March 3, 2014. Retrieved May 25, 2016.
  75. ^'Ian Brzezinski'. Atlantic Council. 2016. Retrieved February 11, 2017.
  76. ^'Democracy, Totalitarianism, and the Culture of Freedom'. National Endowment for Democracy. National Endowment for Democracy. October 15, 2009. Archived from the original on March 28, 2014. Retrieved March 27, 2014.Cite uses deprecated parameter deadurl= (help)
  77. ^'Membership Roster – Council on Foreign Relations'. Cfr.org. Retrieved January 28, 2012.
  78. ^Europejska Akademia Dyplomacji : European Academy of Diplomacy : diplomats.pl : Dyplomacja – Zbigniew BrzezińskiArchived February 2, 2014, at the Wayback Machine
  79. ^'Carter adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski dies at 89'. Politico. May 26, 2017.
  80. ^James Fallows (May 26, 2017). 'Zbigniew Brzezinski'. The Atlantic.
  81. ^'Pogrzeb Zbigniewa Brzezińskiego odbędzie się 9 czerwca' (in Polish). TVN24.pl. June 1, 2017. Retrieved June 1, 2017.
  82. ^Flegenheimer, Matt (June 9, 2017). 'Washington Remembers Brzezinski, and a Very Different Era'. The New York Times. Retrieved June 9, 2017.
  83. ^'Jimmy Carter: Presidential Medal of Freedom Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony'. The American Presidency Project. January 16, 1981. Retrieved June 10, 2017.
  84. ^'Brzezinski gets highest Polish order'. UPI. December 19, 1995. Retrieved June 10, 2017.
  85. ^https://fordham.libguides.com/c.php?g=279582&p=1863748
  86. ^https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/09/us/williams-college-caution-on-science-is-offered.html
  87. ^https://commencement.williams.edu/honorary-degrees/?ffp=5
  88. ^ abhttp://www.kul.pl/honorary-doctorates,art_158.html
  89. ^https://www.vu.lt/en/about-vu/honorary-doctors

Further reading[edit]

  • Avner, Yehuda, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership, The Toby Press, 2010, ISBN978-1-59264-278-6
  • Andrianopoulos, Gerry Argyris. Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of U.S. National Security Policy, Palgrave Macmillan (June 1991), ISBN0-312-05743-1
  • Firestone, Thomas. 'Four Sovietologists: A Primer.' National Interest No. 14 (Winter 1988/9), pp. 102–107 on the ideas of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Stephen F. CohenJerry F. Hough, and Richard Pipes.
  • Gati, Charles, ed. (2013), Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Johns Hopkins University Press, ISBN1421409763.
  • Lubowski, Andrzej. Zbig: The Man Who Cracked the Kremlin (2013) [1]
  • Patrick Vaughan (1999) 'Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980.' Polish Review (1): 3–28
  • Vaïsse, Justin. Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist (2018) scholarly biography
  • Aleksandra Ziolkowska-Boehm: Untold Stories of Polish Heroes from World War II', Chapter: 'Father and Son: Tadeusz and Zbigniew Brzeziński', Hamilton Books 2018, ISBN978-0-7618-6983-2


Major works by Brzezinski[edit]

  • The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism. Harvard University Press. 1956.
  • Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict. Harvard University Press. 1967. ISBN978-0-674-82545-1.
  • Between Two Ages : America's Role in the Technetronic Era. Viking Press. 1970. ISBN978-0-313-23498-9.
  • Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. Farrar, Straus, Giroux. 1983. ISBN978-0-374-23663-2.
  • Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest. Atlantic Monthly Press. 1986. ISBN978-0-87113-084-6.
  • Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. Collier Books. 1990. ISBN978-0-02-030730-3.
  • Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century. Collier Books. 1993. ISBN978-0-684-82636-3.
  • The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Basic Books. 1997. ISBN0-465-02725-3. Subsequently, translated and published in nineteen languages.
  • The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. Basic Books. 2004. ISBN978-0-465-00800-1.
  • Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower. Basic Books. 2007. ISBN978-0-465-00252-8.
  • America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy. Basic Books. 2008. ISBN978-0-465-01501-6.
  • Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. Basic Books. 2012. ISBN978-0-465-02954-9.

Other books and monographs[edit]

  • Russo-Soviet Nationalism, M.A. Thesis, McGill University (1950)
  • Political Control in the Soviet Army: A Study on Reports by Former Soviet Officers, New York, Research Program on the U.S.S.R. (1954)
  • with Carl J. Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1956)
  • Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, New York: Praeger (1962)
  • with Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, New York: Viking Press (April 1963), ISBN0-670-56318-8
  • Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe, Atlantic Policy Studies, New York: McGraw-Hill (1965)
  • The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy, Department of State (1967)
  • International Politics in the Technetronic Era, Sofia University Press (1971)
  • The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan, New York: Harper and Row (1972), ISBN0-06-010468-6
  • with P. Edward Haley, American Security in an Interdependent World, Rowman & Littlefield (September 1988), ISBN0-8191-7084-4
  • with Marin Strmecki, In Quest of National Security, Boulder: Westview Press (September 1988), ISBN0-8133-0575-6
  • The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration, Irvington Publishers (August 1993), ISBN0-8290-3572-9
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, bibliography and drawings = Zbigniew Brzeziński, bibliografia i rysunki, Łódź: Correspondance des arts (1993)
  • with Paige Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe (1996), ISBN1-56324-637-6
  • The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia, Center for Strategic & International Studies (December 2000), ISBN0-89206-384-X

Selected essays and reports[edit]

  • with David Owen, Michael Stewart, Carol Hansen, and Saburo Okita, Democracy Must Work: A Trilateral Agenda for the Decade, Trilateral Commission (June 1984), ISBN0-8147-6161-5
  • with Brent Scowcroft and Richard W. Murphy, Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations Press (July 1997), ISBN0-87609-202-4
  • A Geostrategy for Eurasia, September/October 1997 Foreign Affairs
  • Russia Would Gain by Losing Chechnya The New York Times (November 1999)
  • U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe: Report of an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations Press (July 1999), ISBN0-87609-259-8
  • with Anthony Lake, F. Gregory, and III Gause, The United States and the Persian Gulf, Council on Foreign Relations Press (December 2001), ISBN0-87609-291-1
  • with Robert M. Gates, Iran: Time for a New Approach, Council on Foreign Relations Press (February 2003), ISBN0-87609-345-4
  • Balancing the East, Upgrading the West; U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval, January/February 2012 Foreign Affairs
  • Toward a Global Realignment, July/August 2016 The American Interest

See also[edit]

External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Zbigniew Brzeziński.
Wikiquote has quotations related to: Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Appearances on C-SPAN
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski on Charlie Rose
  • Works by or about Zbigniew Brzezinski in libraries (WorldCat catalog)
  • 'Zbigniew Brzezinski collected news and commentary'. The New York Times.
  • Neal Conan. Brzezinski discusses his participation in the 1978 Camp David, Talk of The Nation, National Public Radio, September 16, 2003.
  • ISSF Roundtable 7-4, Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, discussions by scholars, 2014
  • The Strategic Mind of Zbigniew Brzezinski by John Bernell White Jr
  • Brzezinski formulating a New Foreign Policy Approach toward Russia Center for Strategic & International Studies.
  • Iran: The Crescent of Crisis, (January 1979) Time Magazine
Political offices
Preceded by
Brent Scowcroft
National Security Advisor
Succeeded by
Richard Allen
Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Zbigniew_Brzezinski&oldid=913172472'

The 2008 crash and America and Europe’s continuing economic woes; the rise of China and worries about the decline of the West; and technology-fueled uprisings around the world from the Arab Spring protests to anti-Putin demonstrations in Russia — such developments underscore just how prescient has been in his earlier writings.

In the early 1990s, when some scholars were arguing that the end of the cold war and the implosion of the Soviet Union signified the advent of a new era in which liberal democracy would triumph around the planet, Mr. Brzezinski was warning about the forces of upheaval rumbling through the developing world and the weaknesses of the West that could undermine its global clout.

In his 1993 book “Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century” Mr. Brzezinski argued that the acceleration of communication made possible by technology set contemporary history apart from the past, that China was more likely than Russia to assume a leadership role on the world stage, and that America’s emphasis on “material wealth, on consumption and on the propagation of self-indulgence as the definition of the good life” could endanger its pre-eminence as a global power.

Now, in his provocative new book, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power,” Mr. Brzezinski — the national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter — surveys the current state of world affairs. He provides a clear-eyed, sharp-tongued assessment of this hinge moment in time, when the world’s center of gravity is shifting “from the West to the East.”

This situation has come about, he says, because of America’s economic and political problems at home (including a growing and “eventually unsustainable ,” faltering public education and an increasingly gridlocked and highly partisan political process), misguided foreign policy decisions (most notably George W. Bush’s determination to wage an unnecessary and costly war in Iraq) and the growing mastery, by potential rivals, of “21st-century modernity.”

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Certainly some of these observations will be familiar to readers of recent books by Bill Clinton (“Back to Work”) and Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum (“That Used to Be Us”), but Mr. Brzezinski does a cogent job here of situating America’s relationships with other countries in a geopolitical and historical context. And he uses his expertise in these areas to draw a harrowing portrait of what the world might look like without a re-energized and strategic-minded United States on the global stage.

In the 1990s the United States had become the “first truly global superpower”; since then, he says, there has been a global dispersal of power, with a weakened European Union, along with Russia, China, India and Japan all maneuvering for position. This dispersal of power, he goes on, is magnified by “the emergence of a volatile phenomenon: the worldwide political awakening of populations until recently politically passive or repressed.” He adds: “Occurring recently in Central and Eastern Europe and lately in the Arab world, this awakening is the cumulative product of an interactive and interdependent world connected by instant visual communications and of the demographic youth bulge in the less advanced societies composed of the easy-to-mobilize and politically restless university students and the socially deprived unemployed.”

In such an increasingly unstable world, Mr. Brzezinski suggests, the United States remains, in the words of the former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, the “indispensable nation.” Though no longer a hegemonic colossus, America remains essential, in his view, to promoting “a larger and more vital West” (embracing “perhaps in varying ways, both Turkey and a truly democratizing Russia”) while at the same time playing the “role of balancer and conciliator” in Asia. There it ought to engage China “in a serious dialogue regarding regional stability” to reduce the possibility not only of American-Chinese conflicts but also of miscalculations between China and Japan, or China and India, or China and Russia.

Mr. Brzezinski notes that President Obama has “failed to speak directly to the American people about America’s changing role in the world, its implications, and its demands,” but this book curiously lacks any detailed analysis of Mr. Obama’s policies so far — nothing remotely approaching the acute assessments of Presidents George W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush contained in this author’s 2007 book, “Second Chance,” which charted the opportunities he considers missed at the end of the cold war (like using the victory in the first Gulf war strategically to press for an Israeli-Palestinian accord).

Also missing from this book are any substantive discussions of how the United States might overcome “its staggering domestic challenges and reorient its drifting foreign policy” and how the current might affect the United States and the future fortunes of the West.

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What Mr. Brzezinski does do here — lucidly, and for the most part with great persuasiveness — is explore the consequences that a steady slide by America into impotence and irrelevance might have on the rest of the world. Such a development, he argues, would probably not result in the “ ‘coronation’ of an effective global successor” like China, but would likely lead to a “protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers.”

An America “in serious decline for domestic and/or external reasons,” he says, would lead to a breakdown in the ability of the international system to prevent conflict once it became evident that “America is unwilling or unable to protect states it once considered, for national interest and/ or doctrinal reasons, worthy of its engagement.” As he sees it, a more Darwinian world of tumbling dominoes would most likely result: there would be little to prohibit regional powers (like Russia) from exerting claims on neighbors falling within traditional or claimed spheres of influence (like Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine). Taiwan would become increasingly vulnerable, and so too would Israel.

In the case of Afghanistan, Mr. Brzezinski says, a failure to sustain United States-sponsored international involvement in the region could turn that country into a haven again for international terrorism, while a decline in American power and aid could lead to a worst-case outcome in which Pakistan devolved into “some variation of nuclear warlordism” or became “a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran.”

For that matter, Mr. Brzezinski suggests, a weakened America would increase the dangers of nuclear proliferation around the world. Were doubts to be raised about the United States’ nuclear umbrella, he says, countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey and Israel would have to seek security elsewhere — that elsewhere meaning “nuclear weapons of one’s own or from the extended deterrence of another power — most likely Russia, China or India.”

Global environmental issues — including and growing water shortages — would be similarly affected. In a gloomy conclusion to this insightful book Mr. Brzezinski writes that without a revitalized America helping to manage the international commons, “progress on the issues of central importance to social well-being and ultimately to human survival would stall.”


America and the Crisis of Global Power

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

Illustrated. 208 pages. Basic Books. $26.